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Abstract 
This article explores the conceptualisation of choice as autonomy using three 
components – self-reflection, active decision-making, and quality and range of options 
- and investigates empirical inequalities in autonomy, using newly-collected data for 
the UK. ‘Choice’ has been promoted in social policy across many developed welfare 
states, often on the grounds that it is instrumentally valuable: choice by service users 
is said to incentivise providers to enhance quality and efficiency. But egalitarian and 
capability-based theories of social justice support the idea that choice – understood in 
the deeper sense of autonomy – has an intrinsic value. The empirical findings indicate 
that disabled people are most likely to experience constrained autonomy in all 
respects, while being from a low socio-economic group and/or lacking educational 
qualifications is a risk factor across several components. The fact that limited 
autonomy maps onto existing socio-economic disadvantage is not surprising, but 
points to the importance of taking into account underlying inequalities when 
developing choice-based policies. We conclude that improving the ‘choice’ agenda for 
policy requires opportunities for people to reflect on their objectives throughout the 
life course and that the removal of barriers to active decision-making would require 
effective support and advocacy, especially for disabled people. We suggest that major 
structural inequalities associated with restricted autonomy should be addressed – 
poverty, ill health and geographical inequality – because they place significant 
restrictions on the autonomy of those who are already disadvantaged as well as their 
immediate effects on living standards and quality of life. 
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1. Introduction  
The importance of autonomy as a richer alternative to the concept of ‘choice’ is under-
recognised in social policy. Choice has been promoted as an objective in a range of 
social policy areas in many welfare states – for patients in healthcare, for parents in 
education and childcare, for service users in social care, and for employees in pension 
provision. Considering autonomy as an aspect of choice allows us to distinguish two 
quite different motivations for promotion of ‘choice’. ‘Instrumental’ motivation 
suggests that choice by service users will incentivise providers to respond with 
enhanced quality and efficiency of services (Le Grand, 2007; Clarke et al, 2007), and 
that this in turn will produce better outcomes. On the other hand, ‘intrinsic’ motivation 
suggests that ensuring individuals have greater control over key aspects of their lives, 
such as health, education, housing, and employment and family life, is important in its 
own right (Stevens et al, 2011). Autonomy is central to the intrinsic motivation for 
pursuing policies that promote choice..   
 
Recognition of the core importance of autonomy has been given in the development of 
the Equality Measurement Framework (EMF) in the UK, based on the capability 
approach and the fundamental importance of ‘substantive freedoms’. The EMF 
provides tools for monitoring and evaluating inequality in the substantive freedoms 
enjoyed by people with different socio-demographic characteristics in Britain in the 
21st century (Burchardt and Vizard, 2011). As ‘substantive freedom’ is not directly 
observable, the EMF measures three aspects of substantive freedom in order to build 
up a picture of the overall concept: outcomes, treatment (in the sense of how people 
are treated by others), and autonomy. 
 
In this article, we focus on autonomy. We start by discussing the role of choice and its 
relationship to autonomy in recent social policy across Europe. We then present 
original empirical evidence for the UK on inequalities in individual autonomy of 
people in different aspects of their lives and the extent to which these inequalities map 
onto better known socio-economic inequalities. We conclude with some reflections on 
how existing policies could be reshaped to reduce such inequalities and what new 
policies would be needed to actively support autonomy as opposed to merely ‘choice’.  
 
2. Choice and autonomy 
Theoretical approaches to the intrinsic value of choice are based on its relationship 
with freedom, and draw on a spectrum of philosophical positions, from libertarian 
perspectives through to the capability approach. A libertarian posits freedom as the 
absence of interference from others, or ‘negative liberty’ (Berlin, 1969). Self-
ownership in this sense is a basic and intrinsic right, and being able to choose whether 
or not to do something, for example whether to enter into an exchange, is inherently 
valuable (Nozick, 1974). One implication of the libertarian position is that the act of 
choosing is important (whether you voluntarily decide to do something rather than 
having it imposed on you), but the range of options available to you is not, since the 
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menu is determined by the ‘invisible hand’ of free exchange, any interference with 
which would infringe someone’s basic rights. Moreover, a person’s preferences are 
sovereign, irrespective of whether his/her choice is in fact in his/her best interests. 
 
Liberal egalitarians agree on the importance of libertarian ideas of self-ownership and 
non-interference, but emphasise self-determination in addition: the ability to pursue 
your own conception of the good life. Such pursuit requires two things: individual 
reflection on goals and formation of a plan to achieve them (seen as an essential part 
of being a fully human agent), and secondly, having a fair chance to pursue them. The 
notion of a ‘fair chance’ is controversial, but according to Rawls (1971) rests on social 
and economic institutions designed to ensure that every individual has access to 
‘primary goods’, including income, wealth and status, and such that any inequalities in 
the distribution of these primary goods operate to the advantage of the least well-off. 
Liberal egalitarians, adopt a positive interpretation of freedom which allows for, and 
indeed requires, consideration of external constraints – such as the distribution of 
resources - in contrast to the negative liberty conception of the libertarians. For them, 
the opportunities to choose (i.e. the act of choosing) are less significant than 
opportunities for self-reflection, and for pursuing your conception of the good life.  
 
By contrast, the capability approach focuses on substantive freedom, understood as 
the set of things that people value and have reason to value, and which they are 
actually able to be and do (Sen, 1985, 1999). Substantive freedom can be restricted in 
many ways. People may be hampered in identifying the things they truly value 
because, for example, their expectations have become conditioned by enduring years 
of deprivation. They may be pressurised, oppressed or coerced by others. The public 
and private resources available to them may be limited, or it may be difficult to 
convert their resources into the things they want to be and do, as a result of personal 
characteristics such as impairment or as a result of institutional barriers. ‘Choice’ does 
not play a major role in the capability approach, but the broader concept of 
‘autonomy’, as reflected in the idea of substantive freedom, is central.  
 
3. The ‘choice’ agenda in welfare states 
To date, most conceptualisations of choice in policy appear to be closer to the 
libertarian end of the spectrum. The Swedish ‘choice revolution’ of 1991 reformed 
healthcare, education, childcare and care for older people alongside an expansion in 
private provision and rights for patients, parents and care users to choose a provider 
(Blomqvist, 2004). Corporatist welfare states like France, Germany and the 
Netherlands promoted ‘choice’ through giving payments to older people to purchase 
care services, while France adopted similar approaches for parents to purchase 
childcare (Morel, 2007). Choice of social insurance fund has been promoted across 
several European welfare states (Thompson and Dixon 1996). In Italy, the rhetoric of 
freedom of choice in welfare is established (Fenger, 2009; Graziano, 2009) but patient 
choice has put financial strain on geographically fixed services (Fabbri and Robone 
2008).  
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The promotion of ‘choice’, when understood primarily as choice between providers in 
a socially regulated market, fits with ‘liberal welfare state’ ideology. The objective is 
to frame the choices ‘consumers’ of public services face in such a way as to encourage 
them to select providers on the basis of quality rather than merely convenience. This 
framing, as a form of external direction, can itself be seen as in tension with intrinsic, 
autonomy-based, motivations for the promotion of choice. Australian reforms have 
included vouchers for childcare (Warner and Gradus, 2011), individualised budgets 
for disabled service users (Spall et al, 2005) and school choice (Whitty and Power, 
2000). A new emphasis on choice in public services emerged in the 1980s in the UK: 
with the ‘Right to Buy’ for council tenants, the creation of GP fundholders, and 
parental choice of secondary school (Clarke and Newman, 1997). Subsequent New 
Labour choice mechanisms aimed to imitate market processes in public service 
reforms (Clarke, Newman and Westmarland, 2007), especially in healthcare, but also 
in school education with the creation of school league tables, in housing through 
‘choice-based lettings’, and in social care with the expansion of direct payments and 
later individual budgets. The Coalition government’s healthcare reforms extend 
competition between, and choice of, providers, and education reforms extend choice 
to include Free Schools. Greve (2009) argues that the consequences of choice requires 
empirical studies but interpretation of such evidence remains controversial (Dixon et 
al, 2010; 6, 2003; Le Grand, 2007; Cooper et al, 2011; Pollock et al, 2011).  
 
There has been little reflection in the UK or elsewhere of egalitarian or capability-
inspired conceptualisations of the value of choice. The one exception is in social care 
services (Glendinning, 2008). The disability movement campaigned for many decades 
for disabled people to have greater ‘choice and control’ over their lives, arguing that 
this was of value for its own sake and a matter of basic rights. The campaign 
influenced the introduction of direct payments in the 1996 Community Care Act in the 
UK, and their subsequent expansion in the 2000s (Morris, 2006). Even so, the 
resulting policies bear close resemblance to voucher mechanisms (and thus efficiency-
based instrumental choice) that have been developed in other sectors: direct payments 
to and individual budgets for disabled and older people are given to purchase care 
rather than receiving services directly from social services. Stevens et al (2011) argue 
that such innovations have only partly lived up to their original purpose and that, in 
reality, the ‘antagonisms of choice’ - reproduction of inequalities, power imbalances, 
and the gap between ‘consumer’ decisions and public priorities - can all be detected in 
relation to individual budgets. The approach remains rooted in a conception of choices 
made as consumers rather than choices made through active, democratic and 
collective participation as citizens. 
 
Overall, instrumental motivations for promoting choice have dominated policymaking 
leading to the concentration on services rather than outcomes as the locus for choice: 
we are invited to choose between hospitals, schools, care agencies, and pension 
providers, but all such services are a means to an end rather than ends in themselves. 
The degree of control we may or may not be able to exercise over the outcomes that 
we actually value - our health, education, daily life and security in old age is mostly 
overlooked or ignored by this approach. The concept of ‘choice’ itself has 
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consequentially been narrowed to the act of ‘choosing’, losing the richer shades of 
meanings associated with intrinsically-valued choice such as opportunity, 
empowerment, freedom and autonomy. 
 
4. The intrinsic value of choice: autonomy as an alternative concept 
Clarke et al (2007) argue that, ‘choice as an abstract liberal value does not centre on 
the market... Rather choice is about the capacity for self-direction exercised by a self-
possessed individual in the personal, social, economic and political arrangements’ in 
which they find themselves (p248). Choice is not a simple or singular concept. 
Having, making and realising choices are different processes and socio-economic 
inequalities may mean that one does not translate into the other, for example in school 
choice (Clarke et al, 2007). Taylor-Gooby (1998) also criticises the choice agenda in 
welfare policy as being over-simplistic and points to the numerous ways in which 
decision-making in practice deviates from the ‘ideal’ model conceived by rational 
choice theory, demonstrating the importance of ‘anchor’ points that lead to loss and 
risk aversion, the limits on the range and type of information people can process 
(bounded rationality), and the salience of social context and pre-existing beliefs and 
normative commitments. Levett (2003) argues that choice has been construed in an 
overly-individualistic way because choices are constrained in practice, by context and 
by the choices made by others, while some goals – such as public goods – can be 
obtained only through collective rather than individual decision-making.  
 
We explore the capability approach as one way to encapsulate the intrinsic value of 
choice – conceived as autonomy – as an alternative to viewing choice in purely 
instrumental terms. This approach can generate a different, and perhaps richer, 
concept than that derived from libertarian and associated ‘consumer’ perspectives; 
developing concepts that resemble the engagement and participation discourse, 
incorporating ideas about improved decision-making, participation and self-reflection 
through processes that may be joint with others rather than necessarily in competition 
with them.. We demonstrate below one way to capture, measure and apply such an 
approach empirically, yielding new insights into inequalities in autonomy as 
experienced by different sections of the British population, with implications for 
policy design.  
 
Our analysis forms part of the development of the EMF, based on the capability 
approach. Autonomy in the EMF approach is broken down into three components, 
with corresponding barriers to the achievement of autonomy, as summarised in Table 
1.  
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Table 1: Autonomy - conceptual scheme 
 
Components of autonomy Constraints on autonomy 
Self-reflection Conditioned expectations; 
false consciousness 
Active or delegated decision-
making 
Passivity; pressure from 
others; coercion 
Wide range of high-quality 
options (perceived and 
actual) 
Structural constraints; lack of 
resources; lack of 
information, advice and 
support 
 
This conceptual scheme draws on both the capability approach itself and a wide-
ranging cross disciplinary literature review on autonomy and closely-related concepts 
such as agency, empowerment, self-determination, and ‘choice and control’ (see 
Burchardt and Holder, 2012). Our conceptual scheme incorporates both accounts 
which take autonomy (and its cognates) to be a purely internal characteristic of an 
individual - a state of mind, a disposition, or a set of mental processes (Chirkov et al, 
2003; Ryan and Deci, 2006) – and those which take account of the external 
environment, including the quantity and quality of options available to the individual 
(Cole et al, 2000; Morris, 1998; Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005; Narayan, 2005; Bavetta 
and Peragine, 2006).  
 
‘Self-reflection’, reflecting on and evaluating your objectives and preferences, is 
present in almost all conceptualisations of autonomy, and is central to Doyal and 
Gough’s (1986) influential theory of human need. Empirically, Taylor-Gooby (1998) 
reaffirmed that social context and the individuals’ set of beliefs were an important 
influence on how individuals evaluated the choices on offer. 
 
 ‘Active or delegated decision-making’, links the purely internal self-reflection 
component and the third, external, ‘range of options’ component. As Clarke (2010) 
observes, making a complex choice requires reacting to the world, appraising it, 
making sense of contextual information, and identifying a response – a process which 
can be emotionally and intellectually demanding. It is important to allow for possible 
of delegation of decision-making, or undertaking it jointly with one or more others. 
Provided the decisions to delegate or share are freely taken, it implies no reduction in 
autonomy. 
 
 ‘Autonomy’ must extend beyond the individual to consideration of his/her 
circumstances and in particular to the menu of real opportunities which s/he faced, 
both in order to reflect the concept of substantive freedom described above and to be 
of applied policy relevance The existence of real opportunities is necessary but not 
sufficient. Such opportunities must be both perceived and realisable, hence the third 
component of autonomy in our scheme, ‘wide range of high-quality options 
(perceived and actual)’.  
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The importance of this final component is confirmed in applied literature in social 
policy; D’Souza, Conolly and Purdon (2008) comment on the need to take into 
account context of choice and quality of options available when considering how 
freely parents have made decisions about employment versus staying at home to look 
after the children, while Exworthy and Peckham’s (2006) study highlights the way in 
which travel times and logistics constrain patients’ ability to exercise choice in 
healthcare. 
 
The three components of autonomy are both cumulative and independent in the sense 
that it is possible for someone to be reflective but not to make an active decision, or to 
make an active decision but from a very limited range of options. To be fully 
autonomous, all three components need to be in place.  
 
The capability approach in general and thus the concept of autonomy in particular are 
not without their critics. Firstly, the approach is sometimes accused of being overly 
individualistic (Stewart, 2005; Dean, 2009). Individuals are interdependent and so are 
the decisions they make; thus one person’s autonomy cannot sensibly be evaluated 
separately from another’s. In response, it is important to make the distinction between 
ethical individualism and methodological individualism. The capability approach 
shares with the rest of the liberal tradition a presumption that it is ultimately 
individuals that matter, rather than some collective entity such as the state, the family 
or a cultural group – in contrast, say, to communitarianism. However there is no 
implication that any individual’s circumstances can be understood without reference 
to their significant others or their wider social and economic relations. Our concept of 
autonomy is ethically individualist – we are interested in the individual’s autonomy or 
lack of it rather than some idea of group autonomy – but not methodologically 
individualist: in evaluating the autonomy of individuals, we must take account of their 
past, the cultural influences on them, their interaction with others in decision-making 
(positively through shared decisions and commitments or negatively through 
coercion), and crucially, the structural constraints which operate to define the range of 
possibilities available to them and to others. 
 
A second criticism, as advanced by Dean (2009), is that the capability approach fails 
to acknowledge fundamental macro- socio-economic constraints, and in particular the 
inherent contradiction between promoting substantive freedom and the exploitation of 
labour under capitalism ‘the systemic impediments to human freedom that are 
associated with the capitalist mode of production’ (pp271-2). It is not our intention to 
argue against economic determinism but to understand its effects, and contribute to 
developing strategies to ameliorate its worst effects. By concentrating specifically on 
autonomy, we can identify who is disempowered and disadvantaged under existing 
social and economic arrangements – and do so in a way which is often overlooked by 
conventional analysis of poverty and inequality.  
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5. Measuring autonomy: data and methods 
Our research to empirically capture measures of autonomy began with a review of 
existing survey instruments that indicated that although aspects of autonomy might be 
captured by particular scales and questions (such as the Rotter (1966) locus of control 
scale and the OPHI (2008) empowerment module), there was no comprehensive 
measure fit for our purpose. We therefore developed our own questionnaire, drawing 
on tried and tested questions where possible, and supplementing them where needed 
to ensure our conceptual framework was reflected as fully as possible. These are 
difficult concepts unfamiliar to many people and thus difficult to empirically test by 
survey. We subjected draft questionnaires to cognitive interviewing prior to a full 
survey - a process in which respondents are asked retrospectively what they 
understood by each question (Beatty, 2004). The results are reported in Burchardt and 
Holder (2012). Our final, shorter, questionnaire comprising 17 main questions with 
sub-questions which was fielded as part of the Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
Opinions Survey in July 2009. The Opinions Survey is a face-to-face household 
survey, designed to be nationally representative (including of the disabled and older 
populations). However the response rate is only around 50 per cent, so population 
weights are applied to the data where appropriate to counteract non-response and 
sample design bias. The achieved sample size in the relevant month was 1,051 adults 
aged 16 or over. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 Weighted percentage of 
whole sample 
Unweighted number in 
sample 
Male 49 446 
Female 51 605 
   
White British 84 904 
Any other ethnicity (1) 16 147 
   
Not disabled 83 822 
Disabled (2) 17 227 
  of which:    
Male 8 99 
Female 9 128 
   
Age 16-44 4 41 
Age 45-64 6 76 
Age 65 plus 7 110 
   
High occ group/qualified 5 62 
Low occ group /no quals 10 145 
Other 2 19 
   
Age 16-24 15 81 
Age 25-44 34 337 
Age 45-54 17 157 
Age 55-64 15 178 
Age 65-74 11 146 
Age 75 plus 9 152 
   
High occ group / qualified 
(3) 
38 401 
Low occ group / no quals 45 509 
Other 16 139 
   
All 100 1051 
Notes:  
(1) Although a more complete ethnic categorisation is recorded in the survey, the sample size is not 
large enough to permit analysis by sub-group. 
(2) Disability status is based on a positive answer to two questions: ‘Do you have any long-standing 
illness, disability or infirmity?’, and ‘Does this illness or disability limit your activities in any way?’ 
(3) This is a combined socio-economic status/educational qualifications variable, based on four 
categories of socio-economic classification (NS-SEC) (professional and managerial; intermediate; 
routine and manual; not classified) and four categories of highest educational qualification (degree or 
equivalent; below degree level UK-recognised qualification; other; and none) and is constructed as 
follows: (1) ‘High occ group / qualified’ = Professional and managerial OR intermediate socio-
economic group, AND has degree or below degree level qualifications; (2) ‘Low occ group / no quals’ 
= Routine and manual socio-economic group OR no qualifications. (3) ‘Other’ = not covered by (1) or 
(2) ie ‘not classified’ socio-economic group OR ‘other’ qualifications 
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Four types of question were asked
1
: (1) overall measures of autonomy; (2) questions 
on overall autonomy in relation to specific areas of life (health, family life, 
employment, etc); (3) questions on each component of autonomy as defined by the 
conceptual framework; and (4) detailed questions on each component of autonomy in 
relation to three areas of life (major household expenses, work/life balance, and 
relationships). Overall measures of autonomy included, ‘I am able to do the things that 
are important to me’ on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 represents ‘never or almost never’ 
and 5 represents ‘always or nearly always’; and a 10-point scale for responses to the 
statement, ‘Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their 
lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to 
them’.
2
 The latter scale was also asked in relation to specific areas of life. 
Components of autonomy were assessed using a battery of questions as listed in Table 
3.  
 
The use of multiple indicators ensures greater coverage of the concept of autonomy 
and is also likely to enhance the reliability of the overall measure because 
measurement error on one indicator may be offset by measurement error on another 
(Groves et al, 2009). High item response rates occurred and responses were generally 
correlated in the expected ways, which, together with the prior cognitive testing gave 
us confidence in the overall validity of the measures. However, it should be 
remembered that there are limits to what we can expect to learn from self-assessments 
of autonomy; people may believe they are in control of aspects of their lives when 
they are in fact not, or they may believe they have no opportunities when in fact they 
do. This was particularly apparent in relation to the first component of autonomy, 
‘self-reflection’: it is difficult to meaningfully ask people to reflect on whether they 
are self-reflective, or on the extent to which their preferences have become adapted to 
their circumstances. These limitations imply firstly that careful interpretation of the 
results is required, and secondly, that measures of autonomy need to be put alongside 
other, more objective, indicators of a person’s ‘beings and doings’ to get a full picture 
of their capabilities (Burchardt and Vizard, 2011).  
 
We carried out confirmatory factor analysis on the questions that were intended to 
capture each component of autonomy in order to test and validate our conceptual 
framework. Factor analysis examines the correlation between variables and allows one 
to group the variables into a smaller number of ‘factors’ (Bryman and Cramer, 2000). 
The variables within each factor are more strongly associated with one another than 
with the variables in other factors. The factor analysis produced six factors, and using 
a threshold of a factor loading of 0.4, the questions can be grouped as shown in Table 
2.
3
 The table also shows ‘Cronbach’s alpha’ for each group of questions, which is a 
measure of the internal consistency of a scale.  
                                              
1
  The questionnaire and the survey data have been deposited and are available at the UK Data 
Archive (Study Number 6826). 
2
  This question was taken from the OPHI (2008) empowerment module.  
3
  Factor analysis using unweighted least squares extraction method and Oblimin with Kaiser 
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The factor analysis suggests a good fit with the conceptual framework but with some 
interesting deviations. As we noted earlier, the self-reflection component was not well 
captured and the items grouped here under factor 1 are only a loose conceptual fit; we 
therefore label it ‘self-direction’ rather than ‘self-reflection’. The active decision-
making component split in the factor analysis into two different forms of constraint on 
decision-making: which we here call ‘fatalism’ and ‘pressure from others. The items 
in the fatalism factor have good face validity (‘My life has shaped itself without me 
making choices’, and ‘There is no point trying to improve my life, there’s nothing that 
can be done’) but a low Cronbach’s alpha. Five of the items in the ‘pressure from 
others’ factor have good face validity, the remaining three less so, but overall the scale 
has a good Cronbach’s alpha. Finally, the factor analysis suggested three different 
forms of structural constraint: those relating to ill-health, poverty, and location, each 
of which has strong face validity and a respectable Cronbach’s alpha.
4
  
 
  
                                                                                                                                            
normalization rotation method. There is no agreed threshold for interpreting factor loadings 
and the decision must be informed both by the purpose of the exercise and in the light of the 
underlying theory. Four questions did not load sufficiently on any factor to be included: ‘I 
tend to be influenced by people with strong opinions’; ‘I judge myself by what I think is 
important, not by what others think is important’; ‘There’s really no way to solve some of the 
problems I have’; and ‘Lack of self-confidence prevents me from doing things that are 
important to me’. 
4
  Interestingly ‘discrimination towards me’ loads onto Factor 6, associated with location, rather 
than Factor 3, associated with the attitudes of others.  
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Table 3: Results of factor analysis on components of autonomy 
 
  
Factor 1: Self-direction 
 I have a clear idea of how I want to lead my life 
 I feel I am free to decide for myself how to live my life 
 I feel free to plan for the future 
 I feel that life is full of opportunities 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.69) 
 
Factor 2: Fatalism 
 My life has shaped itself without me making choices 
 There is no point trying to improve my life, there’s nothing that can be done 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.45) 
 
Factor 3: Pressure from others 
 Sometimes I feel that I am being pushed around in life 
 Other people’s attitudes prevent me from doing things that are important to me 
 Someone else prevents me from doing things that are important to me 
 Pressure from others... 
 Disapproval from others... 
 Lack of support... 
 Lack of advice... 
 Family responsibilities... 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83) 
 
Factor 4: Health constraints 
 My health prevents me from doing things that are important to me 
 My age... 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.65) 
 
Factor 5: Money constraints 
 Shortage of money prevents me from doing things that are important to me 
 Being in debt... 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.69) 
 
Factor 6: Location constraints 
 Where I live prevents me from doing things that are important to me 
 Lack of transport... 
 A community I am part of... 
 Discrimination towards me... 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.69) 
 
Italics indicate items which belong statistically but are less clearly relevant to the factor 
from a theoretical perspective.  
The ‘...prevents me from doing things that are important to me’ questions offered 
respondents a 5-point scale from ‘Never or almost never’ to ‘Always or nearly always’. 
All other questions offered a 5-point scale from ‘Strongly disagree’ to ‘Strongly agree’.  
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6. Results: inequalities in autonomy 
Our results demonstrate that intrinsically valuable autonomy is unequally distributed 
across the population and is linked to other socio-economic inequalities. The 
implications of these findings for choice-based welfare policy are explored in our 
concluding discussion.  
 
6.1 Inequality in overall autonomy 
Over a third of respondents (36%) said ‘always or nearly always’, ‘able to do the 
things that are important to me’ while 45% said ‘often’. Fewer than 2% said ‘never or 
almost never’. A similar distribution, skewed towards the ‘high autonomy’ end of the 
spectrum, was observed for the 10-point scale on ‘Some people feel they have 
completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what 
they do has no real effect on what happens to them’. Responses to the two questions 
were significantly and positively correlated (correlation coefficient +0.27, significant 
at the 99% level). This is reassuring in terms of the validity of the questions. The 
‘things that are important’ question is taken as our core measure of overall autonomy 
in the analysis that follows, although we return to the ‘choice and control’ ladder 
when considering specific areas of life.  
 
These initial questions on overall autonomy suggest that the majority of people enjoy 
reasonably high levels of autonomy. But who lacks autonomy? Figure 1 shows the 
results of an ordered logistic regression on ‘I am able to do the things that are 
important to me’ by socio-economic characteristics. Bars above the horizontal axis 
indicate the characteristic has a positive association with autonomy (and below the 
line a negative association), controlling for the other characteristics listed. The 
reference category is a White, non-disabled, 45-54 year old man in a professional, 
managerial or intermediate socio-economic group with some qualifications. The 
whiskers show 95% confidence intervals; where the whiskers cross the horizontal axis 
no statistically significant relationship exists. The socio-demographic characteristics 
together account for relatively little of the overall variation in autonomy but as the 
models here are being used to explore inequalities in autonomy rather than to explain 
autonomy overall, this is not such an important limitation.  
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Figure 1 
 
Source: author’s calculations using ONS Opinions Survey Autonomy Module, July 2009 
Notes: N = 1019, Pseudo R
2
 = 0.03, Cut points 0.5, -1.3, -2.9, -4.3.  
 
The most striking association is that with disability: disabled people (here measured as 
experiencing a limiting long-standing illness or disability) are significantly less likely 
to be ‘able to do the things that are important’ to them. There is also an association 
between low socio-economic group/lack of educational qualifications and low 
autonomy.
5
 The relationship with age is somewhat complex: older people aged 55 and 
above report higher levels of autonomy than the middle aged (25-44 and 45-54), but 
the youngest age group (16-24) may have slightly higher levels of autonomy again, 
though this is not statistically significant. There is no significant association between 
overall autonomy and gender or ethnicity – here measured crudely by a White/Non-
White categorisation because the sample size unfortunately does not allow for a more 
fine-grained approach.  
                                              
5
  Socio-economic group (NS-SEC) and educational qualifications were initially entered 
separately into the regression analyses. NS-SEC was significant in some models and 
educational qualfications in others. They are strongly correlated. In the interests of 
simplifying the presentation of results, a combined indicator was created. The combined 
socio-economic group/educational qualifications variable is based on four broad categories of 
current or most recent occupation (NS-SEC) (professional and managerial; intermediate; 
routine and manual; not classified) and four categories of highest educational qualification 
(degree or equivalent; below degree level UK-recognised qualification; other; and none) and 
is constructed as follows: (1) ‘High occ group / qualified’ = Professional and managerial OR 
intermediate socio-economic group, AND has degree or below degree level qualifications; (2) 
‘Low occ group / no quals’ = Routine and manual socio-economic group OR no 
qualifications. (3) ‘Other’ = not covered by (1) or (2) ie ‘not classified’ socio-economic group 
OR ‘other’ qualifications.   
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Disability status turns out to be significant in relation to several aspects of autonomy. 
For this reason, we also explored whether disability interacted with sex, age or socio-
economic classification, in other words, whether the association of disability with 
limited autonomy was greater for some sub-groups of disabled people than for others. 
For this measure of overall autonomy, we found the association with limited 
autonomy was particularly strong among younger disabled people (aged 16-44), and 
also among those who were in routine or manual occupations or who lacked 
educational qualifications.  
 
6.2 Inequality in constraints on autonomy 
Each of the six components of autonomy identified by the factor analysis are 
correlated with overall autonomy, with coefficients ranging from -0.37 for pressure 
from others, down to -0.19 for fatalism.
6
 But different constraints on autonomy are 
experienced by different people, as shown in Figures 2 to 7. 
 
Figure 2 
 
Source: author’s calculations using ONS Opinions Survey Autonomy Module, July 2009 
Notes: N = 1005, Adjusted R
2
 = 0.03, Constant 2.1 
                                              
6
  The correlation coefficients between the ‘choice and control’ measure of overall autonomy 
and each component are similar, for example -0.29 for pressure from others and -0.20 for 
fatalism. 
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Figure 3 
 
Source: author’s calculations using ONS Opinions Survey Autonomy Module, July 2009 
Notes: N = 1003, Adjusted R
2
 = 0.15, Constant 1.9 
 
Figure 4 
 
Source: author’s calculations using ONS Opinions Survey Autonomy Module, July 2009 
Notes: N = 1001, Adjusted R
2
 = 0.11, Constant 2.1 
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Figure 5 
 
Source: author’s calculations using ONS Opinions Survey Autonomy Module, July 2009 
Notes: N = 1018, Adjusted R
2
 = 0.38, Constant 1.8 
 
Figure 6 
 
Source: author’s calculations using ONS Opinions Survey Autonomy Module, July 2009 
Notes: N = 1018, Adjusted R
2
 = 0.16, Constant 2.3 
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Figure 7 
 
Source: author’s calculations using ONS Opinions Survey Autonomy Module, July 2009 
Notes: N = 1014, Adjusted R
2
 = 0.07, Constant 1.4 
 
To what extent, then, do inequalities in ‘choice as autonomy’ overlap with existing 
inequalities in a way which has potential policy resonance? We can see that disabled 
people are more likely to experience constrained autonomy in all six respects: lack of 
self-direction, fatalism, pressure from others, ill health, lack of money and constraints 
as a result of where they live. Among disabled people, those in a low socio-economic 
group and/or lacking educational qualifications are at significantly greater risk of 
fatalism, and of experiencing constraints due to ill health than those in a higher socio-
economic group with qualifications. Both younger (age 16-44) and older (age 65 plus) 
disabled people are at greater risk of constraints due to where they live than middle 
aged disabled people.  
 
For the population as a whole, being in a low socio-economic group and/or lacking 
educational qualifications is a risk factor for fatalism, and constraints on autonomy 
due to lack of money and ill health. Gender is significant only in relation to pressure 
from others, which women are more likely to report than men (controlling for other 
characteristics). Finally the different age groups experience different predominant 
constraints on autonomy: young people are at risk from constraints related to where 
they live and lack of money, middle age appears to be associated with a higher risk of 
pressure from others relative to older groups, while the older age groups are more 
likely to report constraints related to ill health and to express a degree of fatalism.  
 
6.3 Inequality in choice and control in different areas of life 
Thus far we have considered autonomy and constraints on autonomy evaluated in 
terms of a person’s life as a whole. We turn now to consider different domains of a 
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person’s life in which they may have reason to value autonomy. Table 4 reports the 
average ‘choice and control’ score based on the 10-step ladder in relation to ten areas 
of life. It shows that employment and work/life balance are the areas in which people 
feel they have least choice and control, followed by major household expenses, their 
health and where they live. Family life, relationships, and especially religion and 
belief are areas in which people report higher levels of choice and control.  
 
Table 4: Choice and control in relation to different areas of life 
 
‘Some people feel they have completely free choice and 
control over their lives, while other people feel that what 
they do has no real effect on what happens to them’, 
evaluated on a 10-point scale in relation to... 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Employment* 6.23 2.90 
Work/life balance* 6.34 2.70 
Major household expenses 6.82 2.96 
Health  7.01 2.59 
Where you live 7.09 2.82 
Opportunities for learning 7.25 2.46 
Personal safety 7.56 2.21 
Family life 7.79 2.33 
Relationships 8.02 2.34 
Religion and belief 9.20 1.66 
 
Source: author’s calculations using ONS Opinions Survey Autonomy Module, July 2009 
Notes: * For respondents aged < 65 only. Valid N varies between 700 for * items and a maximum of 
1018 
 
Once again there are significant variations in who reports low choice and control in 
relation to each of these areas. Disabled people, those with low socio-economic 
status/no educational qualifications, and people aged 45-54 were more likely than 
others to report low choice and control in relation to employment, and in relation to 
work/life balance, controlling for other characteristics.
7
 For major household 
expenses, it was disabled people, the young and those with low socio-economic status 
/no educational qualifications who had least choice and control, while for health it was 
women and disabled people. Disability was associated with low choice and control 
across all domains, and low socio-economic status/no educational qualifications 
across a large number (including relationships and opportunities for learning, in 
addition to those already mentioned).  
 
  
                                              
7
  Based on OLS regression of ‘choice and control’ in relation to each area of life on gender, 
ethnicity (White/non-White), disability, age groups, and the combined occupational social 
class/educational qualifications indicator described above. All results reported in the text are 
statistically significant at the 95% level or above. Full results available from the authors on 
request.  
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7. Discussion and conclusions: reshaping policies to promote autonomy 
Our analysis confirms that autonomy is inherently multi-dimensional. An adequate 
concept must encompass the internal (mental) and external (situational) aspects of 
autonomy, and the interaction between them. The empirical analysis shows that 
although the components of autonomy are correlated with each other and with 
summary measures of autonomy, they are independent and reveal different 
inequalities.  
 
How does this affect the distinction between instrumentally and intrinsically valuable 
choice? To focus on the act of choosing, the dominant approach in the ‘choice’ policy 
agenda, risks missing much that reflects constrained autonomy. But even if we do 
concentrate on the ‘active choosing’ aspect of autonomy, the analysis indicates 
distinct ways in which decision-making can be derailed – through pressure from 
others (as typified by the statement ‘Sometimes I feel that I am pushed around in life’) 
or through fatalism (‘There’s no point trying to improve my life, there’s nothing that 
can be done’). Simply ensuring that options are on the table - handing patients a list of 
local hospitals or providing parents with a school league table - is not going to be 
sufficient to ensure that everyone can make an active decision.  
 
Prior to the point of choosing, it is also important that person has been able to form, 
and reflect on, an idea about what they want – based on a rich understanding of what 
might be possible. This is not something that can be achieved overnight and points to 
the importance of developing and reinforcing autonomy through the lifecourse. For 
children and young people, this could include expanding opportunities to participate in 
identifying priorities, making plans and reaching decisions in the family, at school and 
in the wider local and political community. It needs to be supported by exposure to, 
involvement in, and chances to critically reflect on, a wide range of experiences, 
cultures, beliefs and ways of living. In middle-life, the analysis here suggests that 
people may be particularly likely to experience pressure from others, for example in 
the form of restrictions imposed by the attitudes and behaviour of others, and also a 
lack of support and advice. This points to both macro and micro level interventions: 
on the one hand, to society-wide efforts to tackle prejudice, discrimination and 
intolerance, and on the other to more effective provision of support and advice, 
targeted on those areas of life where people feel they have least choice and control – 
employment, work/life balance, and household expenses. For older age groups, the 
dominant limitations on autonomy seem to be related to ill health and a tendency to 
develop a fatalistic attitude. These may of course be related – if restrictions on daily 
life as a result of physical impairments seem to grow inexorably, it is easy to conclude 
that ‘There’s no point trying to improve my life’. But as the social model of disability 
reminds us, there is nothing inevitable about the link between physical impairment 
and limited capability: the provision of appropriate aids, adaptations and practical 
support can ensure that older people can continue to do the things that are important to 
them.  
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Recognising the intrinsic value of choice means that internal and external aspects of 
autonomy need to be tackled together. You cannot make a meaningful autonomous 
choice if the options available to you are all deeply unattractive – between sleeping on 
the streets or in a hostel where you fear for your safety and your few belongings; or 
between relying on your frail life-long partner to bathe and toilet you or being 
separated to go to live in a care home. The idea that there are structural inequalities in 
the real opportunities available to people comes as no surprise to social policy 
analysts, of course, but the pernicious effects not just on inequality of outcome but 
also on inequality of autonomy may be less well understood.  
 
The concept of autonomy, incorporating but not limited to the act of choosing, reveals 
important and systematic inequalities in who enjoys this intrinsically valuable good. It 
is not surprising to find that low socio-economic status and lack of educational 
qualifications is associated with experiencing greater restrictions on autonomy. To put 
it starkly, those at the bottom of the ladder are less able to do the things that are 
important to them, across many areas of life. As Dean (2009) reminds us, this is 
inherent to capitalism. But the degree of inequality generated varies even within 
capitalist systems, and it is important to document and quantify this further 
manifestation of an inequality that is more familiar to us in terms of economic and 
social exclusion.  
 
It is also not surprising to find that disabled people are more likely to experience 
limited autonomy than non-disabled people, controlling for other characteristics. But 
the scope of this lack of autonomy – across components of autonomy and across areas 
of life – is striking. It affects family life, relationships and personal safety as well as 
the more familiar problem areas of education and employment. Disabled people are at 
greater risk of experiencing barriers to autonomy related to poverty and location as 
well as health, and face a significant problem of pressure from others; and among 
disabled people, those with low socio-economic status are worse affected. Disabled 
people themselves have been aware of this for a long time, of course, hence the 
demands for ‘choice and control’ that date back several decades in the disability 
movement. There have been policy developments in the organisation of social care in 
response to these demands, but the evidence presented here suggests they have not yet 
gone nearly deep enough, or wide enough.  
 
Having a range of high quality of services available is of course an important 
precondition for autonomy in a number of important areas of life and it is right that 
considerable attention should be given to both improving the quality of what is on 
offer and to establishing the mechanisms which facilitate the best possible match 
between a person’s needs and the service they get. But considering inequalities in 
autonomy, as opposed to the narrower concept of choosing, presents challenges for the 
mechanisms advocated by the efficiency argument for choice in public services: if 
people are unreflective, pressurised by others, fatalistic, constrained in multiple 
respects and in ways that interact with other areas of their life, their ability to choose 
service providers in a way that maximises their own interests and hence gives the 
correct signal to the providers is seriously restricted. The fact that disadvantage in 
21 
 
autonomy maps onto existing socio-economic inequalities such as disability and social 
class implies that a system based on responding to these signals will tend to be more 
sensitive to the expressed preferences of the already advantaged.  
 
Can choice over services – even a choice over high-quality services – be sufficient to 
secure the intrinsic good of autonomy for individuals in relation to key aspects of their 
lives that they have reason to value? Our findings suggest not. A real ‘choice’ agenda 
requires opportunities for people to identify and reflect on their objectives and this 
needs to be cultivated throughout the life course – with implications for schooling, 
youth participation, multiculturalism policy and advice services, as outlined above. 
Removing barriers to active decision-making requires effective support and advocacy, 
especially for disabled people but also for others at risk of being pressurised by others 
or feeling disempowered, including women in coercive relationships. There are some 
examples of good practice (such as Support Circles: Glendinning 2008) but these too 
tend to focus on services rather than outcomes. Finally, the major structural 
inequalities need to be addressed - poverty, ill health and geographical inequality – not 
only because of their immediate effects on quality of life, but also because of the 
significant restrictions they impose on the autonomy of those who are already 
disadvantaged.  
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